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Gryson
07-01-2018, 05:59 PM
The following is a translation of the final part in a six-part series of articles on the development of the Hitachi SH microcontroller. The article originally appeared in the September 22, 1997 issue of Nikkei Electronics magazine and was subsequently posted on the Renesas website. An archive of the original can be found here (http://web.archive.org/web/20150417010407/http://japan.renesas.com/products/mpumcu/superh/related_sh/theme/story/06.jsp).

This is the only part in the series to discuss Sega's role in the development of the SH.

Fortune and Misfortune are Intertwined; Overcoming Hardship to Reach the World Stage

At last, an evaluation model of the SH microcontroller had been completed. All that remained was to wait for the start of mass production. However, another obstacle blocked the way: almost no users had decided to adopt the SH. The only way to raise widespread awareness in one go was to find a large-scale user to adopt the chip. The target was the home console market, where hundreds of thousands of units could be shipped per month. However, rival makers were several steps ahead. On the tiniest sliver of hope, the SH was promoted to Sega Enterprises.

Something was missing. That was all that Shunpei Kawasaki could think as the SH evaluation chip was finally completed. They had built a RISC microcontroller using an original architecture, and with just two people had put together an instruction set whose performance satisfied even Kawasaki. “The research you’re doing is no good.” Those words said to him six years before had strengthened Kawasaki’s resolve to finish the development of the RISC microcontroller. In that time, just about all of the things he had vowed to do had been accomplished. And yet, something vital was missing: the new microcontroller had no users.

“We’re very interested. We’d love to test it out,” many potential customers said. However, restricted by their project plans, nothing ever came about. Kawasaki could keenly feel the expectations of the Hitachi leadership for the SH. “To be honest, they started to become impatient,” he recalled. No matter how much thought went into the SH, if it didn’t have any users, it was no more than a simple piece of silicon. What could be done?

A Slim Chance

Kawasaki was at a loss for what to do next, but then he heard some encouraging news from one of the sales managers. Hitachi had been promoting the PA-RISC architecture-based PA-10 processor to Sega for inclusion in its next home console, but Sega had just turned it down (the PA-10’s performance is about 10 MIPS). In an effort to redeem themselves, the sales manager wanted to pitch the SH to Sega.

However, the chances of success were slim. Sega was reportedly close to finalizing its choice of NEC’s RISC microcontroller (at that time, Sega was considering about ten different microprocessors and microcontrollers, including the NEC V810 and the Motorola 68040). Nevertheless, there was a remote possibility of success. If the chip was included in a home console, they could expect monthly orders in the hundreds of thousands. This was their big chance to boost the reputation of the SH. They decided to approach the situation as if they had nothing to lose.

In the early summer of 1992, Kawasaki, together with his boss Shirou Baba, sales manager Yasuhiro Ueda, and engineer Junichi Tatesaki, made their way to Sega’s headquarters right next to Haneda Airport. “It has to be a quick victory,” Kawasaki felt. “We have to end it in one shot.” More than was usual for him, he elaborately prepared and practiced his presentation over and over. The long-awaited day had finally arrived.

A Cafeteria Negotiation

The four entered Sega determined to succeed. However, they were told that there were no conference rooms available, and of all places were then led to the company cafeteria. “Employees were sitting in groups around us, chatting away while drinking tea,” Kawasaki recalled.

They met with Kazuhiko Hamada, who was a section manager from Hardware R&D in charge of the hardware design for Sega’s next console (later known as the Saturn). However, let down by the unexpected surroundings, the team from Hitachi failed to find their rhythm as the first day of discussions came to a close. “He told us that it was interesting,” Kawasaki said, but the meeting ended without a clear indication of any real enthusiasm.

Following that first meeting, the team from Hitachi met several more times with Sega, who eventually began to discuss possible conditions for adopting the chip. By some possibility, it seemed that Sega had become interested, and the hopes of the Hitachi team grew.

Some of Sega’s requirements included increasing the performance of the multiplier, including a synchronous DRAM interface circuit, and presenting the results of a hypothetical benchmark for game software.

With their newly assigned tasks, Kawasaki and the sales staff immediately went to work running performance simulations on the new additions. They frequently traveled back and forth to Sega’s offices as the results became available. It seemed that everything was going well. At one point, they were convinced that Sega would adopt the SH.

However, Sega’s attitude remained indecisive. Would they really adopt it? Based on his previous experiences, Kawasaki felt that the situation was bad. “If the other side doesn’t show strong interest after the third meeting,” he said, “then things usually turn out bad.”

Kawasaki’s Second Tough Decision

Meanwhile, in September 1992*, the mass production of the SH-1 had begun. A commemoration ceremony was held in a room in Hitachi’s Musashi factory to celebrate the first shipment.

*[note: the text says 1993 here, but this is almost certainly a typo based on the dates in the rest of the narrative]

It was unusual for Hitachi to hold this kind of event. When the development of the SH first began, it was met with the comment, “Where are we ever going to be able to sell this?” However, as development proceeded, it was designated as a “Special R&D Project” and began to attract strong interest throughout the company. For the development group, the company’s expectations had swelled so much as to almost be a burden.

However, they still had not acquired a large buyer. “We were shipping a few thousands chips per month,” Kawasaki recalled. “All that effort to make the SH, and it wasn’t selling at all. It was a shock.”

As Kawasaki despaired, one day a letter arrived. The sender was the American company GO Corp., an OS maker who worked with portable telecommunications equipment. Inside the letter was a job offer. GO had prepared a special position for Kawasaki as supervisor of technological development in Japan. The proposed salary was astonishingly high.

The SH-1 wasn’t selling. The negotiations with Sega had come to a standstill. And above all, Kawasaki was dissatisfied with his treatment at Hitachi. “I felt that my work wasn’t appreciated by the company,” he said. He decided to accept GO’s job offer.

Three years before, Kawasaki had made the choice to switch companies to Apple Computer Corp., but he gave up the idea before telling anyone else. This time was different. Without delay, Kawasaki informed his boss and coworkers that he was accepting the offer from GO.

An Unexpected Call

Kawasaki had one month remaining at Hitachi. At that point, he was no longer meeting with potential customers, and Sega was no exception. Kawasaki’s coworkers knew that he was soon leaving the company.

One day, Kawasaki was unexpectedly summoned by Tatsushi Itou, the assistant manager of the Hitachi Semiconductor Design and Development Center. At that time, Kawasaki did not know Itou very well and was not sure why he was being summoned.

When Kawasaki arrived, Itou began by saying, “I want to improve your treatment at Hitachi.” It seemed that Itou had seen through to the true cause of Kawasaki’s dissatisfaction. Itou told Kawasaki that he valued all of the work Kawasaki had done, and that Kawasaki was vital to the future of Hitachi’s microcontroller business. “I didn’t think there was anybody like that at Hitachi,” Kawasaki said. The unexpected talk with Itou left a deep impression on Kawasaki, and he changed his mind about leaving the company just in time.

An Abrupt End

In the fall of 1992, Kawasaki, feeling fresh after letting go of the idea of changing jobs, once again visited Sega. He brought with him a graph comparing the performance of the SH with other companies’ microcontrollers, and he was determined to not give up until everything was settled.

Kawasaki received his answer sooner than expected. As soon as he met with Hamada, he was told simply, “Oh, that’s OK. We’ve already decided to go with the SH.” Kawasaki felt the energy drain from his body as the long negotiations came to an abrupt end. It had been decided. The SH would be included in Sega’s next home console.

After the decision by Sega to adopt the SH, the full-scale development of the second SH chip, the SH-2, began in January 1993. Jun Hasegawa, who had just returned from studying at Carnegie Melon University in the U.S., joined the SH development group.

However, more than a few people who had taken part in the SH-1’s development were confused upon hearing of the SH-2. Up to that point, Hitachi had been making a new microcontroller about once every four years. The SH-1, however, had only been in mass production for a few months, so many were perplexed about why the next microcontroller was already being developed. “There was a lot of ‘What?! Are we really making the next one already?’” Takaki Noguchi recalled.

Once development began, however, it proceeded quickly. After having made the 16-bit multiplier for the SH-1, Noguchi and a coworker spent two months rebuilding it as the 32-bit multiplier for the SH-2. They spent their days off designing the synchronous DRAM interface circuit. “From May to July 1993, we worked without taking a single break,” Noguchi said.

A Request from the Research Lab

One day, the SH development group received a written message from Nobuyoshi Doumen, the head of the System Development Lab. It read, “Did anything ever come of the multiprocessor function that we discussed before?”

A few months prior, Doumen had requested the inclusion of a multiprocessor function in the SH-2. At that time, the lab was researching the development of a digital assistant for reading news articles code-named “Yajiuma Shimbun” and wanted to use the SH-2 in a multiprocessor configuration. However, the SH group did not want to include the function just for a research system and had been pretending to overlook the request.

When the second request came, they were unable to continue to ignore it. They were indebted to Doumen for a previous problem with the number of registers in the SH that he had helped them to overcome. They decided to include a rather simple circuit that would allow the SH-2 to be used in a multiprocessor configuration. “In my mind, I thought that certainly nobody would ever use that function,” Kawasaki recalled.

The Secret to Improved Performance

In the summer of 1993, a slight incident occurred. Sega stated that the performance of the SH-2 (25 MIPS) was insufficient for a next-generation home console (this was right around the time when Sega’s biggest rival Nintendo announced that they were including a 64-bit CPU as well as a graphics processor jointly developed with Silicon Graphics, Inc. in their next console, the Nintendo 64). They wanted to increase the performance of the SH-2 by raising the frequency. However, to do that, it would be necessary to re-examine the chip design, and the SH development group did not have the time remaining to do that.

The decision of what to do was left for the top-level meeting between Hitachi and Sega executives that took place in Hakone in September 1993. The SH group had prepared a secret plan to resolve the “performance improvement problem.” Their solution was stated as follows: “If we use the multiprocessor function that is included in the SH-2, we can operate two SH-2s linked together. This should satisfy the request for higher performance.” Nobody had expected that the multiprocessor function, which they had been reluctant to include, would prove to be this useful.

In this way, Sega’s next console, the Sega Saturn, came to be equipped with two SH-2s.

Advancing to Second in the World

In June 1994, mass production of the SH-2 began.

By July, the monthly production output had reached 200,000 chips. Of course, these would supply the Sega Saturn, which would be released in the fall of that year.

By March 1997, a total of 7.56 million Saturn units had been manufactured. In other words, approximately 15 million SH-2 chips had been made for the Saturn. With this, the SH had suddenly risen to the second-most-selling high performance RISC microcontroller, and its name became known throughout the world.

However, in terms of sales, the outcome was by no means favorable. Even though the Saturn was equipped with two SH-2s, that did not mean that profits simply doubled. In fact, the profit per unit decreased. Due to being the first sale, they were unable to increase the profits to a satisfactory level.

The only solution was to decrease costs as much as possible. From April 1994, before the start of mass production, work had begun on reducing the size of the SH-2. After that, a special chip was made for the Saturn that combined two SH-2s into one. This effort paid off, and profits finally rose to a healthy level.

The Real Challenge Lies Ahead

More time is required before the SH will achieve permanent status as “the world’s microcontroller.” In order to increase sales, it will be necessary to quickly grab more users beyond the Saturn. Some success has already begun to appear. The SH-3, announced as the successor to the SH-2 in 1996, is being included in various personal digital assistants running on Microsoft Corp.’s Windows CE OS. However, as of now, it has not yet become a big hit.

End

By Hiroki Eda

Tower of Power
07-02-2018, 08:33 PM
Interesting read, thank you.

Cafeman
07-02-2018, 11:01 PM
Yes, thanks much.

axel
07-03-2018, 02:27 AM
Yeah it's a great write-up but it doesn't make Sega sound good. From reading this I get the impression the SuperH was a processor no one wanted, it was slow even for its time requiring dual CPUs and multiprocessor support was literally an afterthought. How could they pick that over the 68040? Must have been getting a great deal from Hitachi.

Blades
07-03-2018, 05:14 AM
Fantastic work Gryson! Very valuable information. Clearly Sega got a great deal on the SH processors but got screwed by their lack of competitiveness. The writing was on the wall when the SH2's competitiveness was in doubt in 1993. What hope could it have 4-5 years later? They probably expected that this could be worked around with the help of co-processors, like on the Model 1 with the slow V60.

Sato did say he liked the SH in his interview. That was probably the biggest catalyst for adoption.

Hitachi probably made out like a bandit though. Sony implemented the SH-1 in their first DVD player (DVP-S7000) in 1997 which probably raised profits by a healthy amount.

What's interesting is that this shows Sega was aware of the Saturn's possible failure to compete on a technical level even at such an early stage, before the PSX specs were released.

Blades
07-03-2018, 06:34 AM
Also, here's an interesting case study (http://web.stanford.edu/group/htgg/sts145papers/rtan_2001_2.pdf) of the old conflict between SOJ and SOA from Stanford of all places.

Gryson
07-03-2018, 08:28 AM
Yeah it's a great write-up but it doesn't make Sega sound good. From reading this I get the impression the SuperH was a processor no one wanted, it was slow even for its time requiring dual CPUs and multiprocessor support was literally an afterthought. How could they pick that over the 68040? Must have been getting a great deal from Hitachi.

Putting it in the context of Sato's interview helps: When Sega went with the SH (Fall 1992), they were likely still focused on a 2D-based system. Only later, when they started expecting the SH-2 to do the 3D heavy lifting, did they realize it wasn't enough.

I'm also skeptical about the 68040 part. I don't think any Sega staff were interviewed for this article. Sato seemed pretty sure (both in 1998 and in 2018) that it was the 68020.

According to this website (http://processortimeline.info/proc1993.htm), the 68040 cost $393 (in orders of 1000) in May 1993. The computers that used it at the time, the Amiga 4000 and Mac Quadra, sold for $3700 and $5700 respectively. EGM mentioned elsewhere that Sega wasn't considering the 68040 because it was too new and expensive.


Also, here's an interesting case study (http://web.stanford.edu/group/htgg/sts145papers/rtan_2001_2.pdf) of the old conflict between SOJ and SOA from Stanford of all places.

Yeah, that paper comes up frequently on google searches, but don't give it more authority just because it's from Stanford - it's just a student's essay written for class (STS 145). Unfortunately, the author really only consults Steven Kent's and Sam Pettus's works, which are not the most well-informed. The author also misrepresents a quote from Sam Pettus as being from Joe Miller.

I have my doubts about the "conflict." Too many people have firmly rejected it (Joe Miller, Scott Bayless, Marty Franz) or put it in a more understandable light, such as David Rosen:


I played the part of coordinator between San Francisco and Tokyo. There were always differences and problems; my time was spent on that. Tom was great, he did a hell of a job, but it wasn’t always easy for him to understand the decisions in Japan, and there they couldn’t always appreciate necessities like cutting the retail price of the machine. After the Genesis, Sega of America was interested in developing peripherals, while Sega of Japan wanted to move on. It wasn’t necessarily a friction, but there was a lot of going back and forth, helping to resolve issues with the ultimate aim of achieving what both arms of the company wanted.

And Hayao Nakayama (as quoted in MD/Genesis Collected Works) speaks highly of Sega of America and Kalinske without a hint of conflict.

Kalinske himself says that the main conflict as he saw it centered around the Saturn launch:


In many respects, there may have been conflict but they also basically let us do what we wanted for a long time, and I think the 32X is another example of that... I would say that the bigger time of conflict with Japan was when we were basically gonna be forced to introduce Saturn.

(cleaned up from https://forums.sonicretro.org/index.php?showtopic=32913)

The reason I'm bringing this up in this thread is because I think that the Hitachi article illustrates why Sega of Japan likely favored Japanese manufacturers. Think about how closely Kawasaki and Hitachi worked with Sega when designing the SH-2 and the late changes Sega requested. I definitely think Sato was concerned about using a chip where he wouldn't have the power to necessarily make such requests or get assurances (if only for issues of distance and the communication barrier). I don't want to make excuses - just offer the perspective.

BonusKun
07-03-2018, 10:28 AM
This was a very good read. Thank you for posting this.




Also, Any sort of thread shitting about Bernie Stoler or off topic shit I deem annoying as fuck, I'm putting out some foot in your ass ban hammers. You have been warned.

Gryson
07-03-2018, 11:20 AM
This was a very good read. Thank you for posting this.




Also, Any sort of thread shitting about Bernie Stoler or off topic shit I deem annoying as fuck, I'm putting out some foot in your ass ban hammers. You have been warned.

:ok:

gamevet
07-03-2018, 11:28 AM
Bernie Stolar

That’s right, I said it! :p

Moirai
07-03-2018, 12:28 PM
Does anyone have photos of a Saturn mobo with a 2-in-1 SH2 chip?

Blades
07-03-2018, 01:05 PM
Does anyone have photos of a Saturn mobo with a 2-in-1 SH2 chip?

VA15. (https://www9.atwiki.jp/nannansei/pages/14.html#PG14VA15)

Moirai
07-03-2018, 02:26 PM
VA15. (https://www9.atwiki.jp/nannansei/pages/14.html#PG14VA15)

Is VA15 the final Saturn? I want one :D

Though it seems it’ll be difficult to buy a Saturn knowing it’s truly a VA15..

axel
07-03-2018, 09:46 PM
According to this website (http://processortimeline.info/proc1993.htm), the 68040 cost $393 (in orders of 1000) in May 1993. The computers that used it at the time, the Amiga 4000 and Mac Quadra, sold for $3700 and $5700 respectively. EGM mentioned elsewhere that Sega wasn't considering the 68040 because it was too new and expensive.

You're probably right, but remember they didn't have to buy it in 1993. Sega could have made a 32X/Neptune based on a 68020 in 1993 and then rolled out a 68040 Saturn in 1995. Everything could have been backwards compatible, because it's still the same architecture. Or maybe something else entirely, it just looks like the SH-2 was a horrible idea even in 1994, not many people can program two CPUs efficiently in assembly.

zyrobs
07-03-2018, 11:26 PM
You're probably right, but remember they didn't have to buy it in 1993. Sega could have made a 32X/Neptune based on a 68020 in 1993 and then rolled out a 68040 Saturn in 1995. Everything could have been backwards compatible, because it's still the same architecture. Or maybe something else entirely, it just looks like the SH-2 was a horrible idea even in 1994, not many people can program two CPUs efficiently in assembly.

Using the same CPU doesn't make them backwards compatible, it's the rest of the chipset that matters. The Megadrive already had a lot of legacy junk in it going back to the SC-1000 days, and Sega wanted a clean break. It wasn't nowhere near as popular in Japan as it was in the USA, and it was well beyond its prime, so it made perfect sense.

Regardless if the machine actually sold well, they easily could've made a converter cartridge, the Saturn was very easy to expand.


Is VA15 the final Saturn? I want one :D

Though it seems it’ll be difficult to buy a Saturn knowing it’s truly a VA15..

It's actually very easy. Just make sure the revision identifier in the serial is F (15 in hex). There's a list here:
http://evilboris.sonic-cult.net/saturn/index.php?&s3=F&sortby=hw_gen

Sik
07-03-2018, 11:29 PM
I guess the narrative now has changed from "Sega is stupid for considering the 68020" to "Sega is stupid for having picked the SH-2".

Incidentally I'm not confident that using one of their arcade CPUs would have helped much, since they relied on the DSPs to do all the performance-critical 3D math.

Team Andromeda
07-04-2018, 12:19 AM
You're probably right, but remember they didn't have to buy it in 1993. Sega could have made a 32X/Neptune based on a 68020 in 1993 and then rolled out a 68040 Saturn in 1995. Everything could have been backwards compatible, because it's still the same architecture. Or maybe something else entirely, it just looks like the SH-2 was a horrible idea even in 1994, not many people can program two CPUs efficiently in assembly.

Don't some say that Nintendo crippled the Snes with its choice of CPU, that's to keep it compatibility to whats gone before? . Even having one of the SH-2 was better than that the 6820 and if you weren't good enough to use the two, you could always use just the one and still get far better results than the 6820.

Moirai
07-04-2018, 11:25 AM
I feel like people spend more time speculating about what the Saturn could’ve been than they do actually talking about Saturn games... it’s really sad actually lol

Team Andromeda
07-04-2018, 12:03 PM
I feel like people spend more time speculating about what the Saturn could’ve been than they do actually talking about Saturn games... it’s really sad actually lol

Good point, if not for the PS I guess the Saturn would have been a huge seller and all the corps would have had to get used to dual CPU and working with Assembly.

I thought it was NEC and Hudson who messed up their Hardware for the 32bit gen with a low spec CPU and a GPU that could handle just 128 sprites or so.

I really would have liked to see the Mega CD sell better, that system had such potential, that was never fully used.

axel
07-04-2018, 02:24 PM
I feel like people spend more time speculating about what the Saturn could’ve been than they do actually talking about Saturn games... it’s really sad actually lol

LOL! What can I say, I like vintage hardware.

Sik
07-04-2018, 03:21 PM
I thought it was NEC and Hudson who messed up their Hardware for the 32bit gen with a low spec CPU and a GPU that could handle just 128 sprites or so.
I thought PC-FX did better than that? But yeah, its main killer was the complete lack of 3D support in hardware. NEC insisted that real-time 3D at the time looked ugly and that it'd be better to stick to prerendered graphics... yeah, that worked wonders, sure. Worse, PC-FX was originally meant to release in 1992 (I think) but developers didn't want to jump ship from the PC Engine that early, so NEC just delayed it instead of trying to keep improving it.

Seriously, they deserved it :v (that, and NEC apparently wasn't that interested on the game market for starters, it was mostly Hudson pushing forwards)


I really would have liked to see the Mega CD sell better, that system had such potential, that was never fully used.
THIS. That scaler hardware that could have allowed many games that none of the 4th gen consoles could do on their own (SNES at best to some limited extent) and it went wasted on FMV and cheap ports in large part ._.

Team Andromeda
07-04-2018, 03:52 PM
I thought PC-FX did better than that?

No it was based on the Super Grafx and speaking of that, one could say NEC crippled that system as wel, by going with the compatibility and whats gone before route and staying with the same CPU . The PC Eng FX was ever worse, low powered 2D hardware, no 3D hardware and a rather basic and slow main CPU. Such a mighty downfall, from the classic PC engine and how far ahead of its time that system was, on its launch.



That scaler hardware that could have allowed many games that none of the 4th gen consoles could do on their own

And for that Sega Japan needed a going kicking, they make this powerful add-on and leave it to die, with poor software support and little use of the ASIC chip. The Mega CD should have been playing host to the likes of OutRun, Power Drift, AB II, Super Hang ON, GF II with Arcade perefct music and Arcade quailty sound effects and all using the ASIC chip . I would have loved to have seen Strider on the system made by the Mega CD CS Final Fight Team and using its engine and games like Indiana Jones and the Fate of Atlantis, Phantasy Star IV with the promised 40 mins of FMV and ASIC dungons and CD-DA music and speech.

What could have been, sadly SOJ didn't seem to care for the system at all

Moirai
07-04-2018, 04:37 PM
Good point, if not for the PS I guess the Saturn would have been a huge seller and all the corps would have had to get used to dual CPU and working with Assembly.

I thought it was NEC and Hudson who messed up their Hardware for the 32bit gen with a low spec CPU and a GPU that could handle just 128 sprites or so.

I really would have liked to see the Mega CD sell better, that system had such potential, that was never fully used.

Part of what makes the Saturn cool in my eyes is the fact it was the underdog.... I play mine every day... I have four saturns..it’s my only sega system I use daily..

Leynos
07-04-2018, 04:56 PM
Of course part of me really wishes Saturn came out on top that gen with better hardware and sales but the other part of me loves the system so much because it in itself is a hidden gem. Saturn is so freaking loaded with hidden gems and obscure titles PS1 didn't get.

Silanda
07-04-2018, 08:37 PM
I thought PC-FX did better than that? But yeah, its main killer was the complete lack of 3D support in hardware. NEC insisted that real-time 3D at the time looked ugly and that it'd be better to stick to prerendered graphics... yeah, that worked wonders, sure. Worse, PC-FX was originally meant to release in 1992 (I think) but developers didn't want to jump ship from the PC Engine that early, so NEC just delayed it instead of trying to keep improving it.

Best as I can find from a quick Googling, the PC-FX had two of the PC Engine's video chips, like the Supergrafx, alongside a new background processor, MJPEG video decoder, and what looks like chip to handle compositing everything (and possibly handle transparency, though I'm unclear about this). Interestingly, the PC-FX add on board for the PC-98 (the PC-FXGA) had a 3D accelerator chip. Whether that was developed after the PC-FX, or whether it was developed earlier but dropped from the final console is unknown as far as I can tell.

gamevet
07-04-2018, 09:21 PM
Of course part of me really wishes Saturn came out on top that gen with better hardware and sales but the other part of me loves the system so much because it in itself is a hidden gem. Saturn is so freaking loaded with hidden gems and obscure titles PS1 didn't get.

Unfortunately, those hidden gems come at a really high price tag. I'm just fortunate to have owned the console when I could get most of the games on the cheap.

Blades
07-04-2018, 09:23 PM
Unfortunately, those hidden gems come at a really high price tag. I'm just fortunate to have owned the console when I could get most of the games on the cheap.

>|>Phantom Universal<|<

Moirai
07-04-2018, 11:29 PM
The Saturn just has a special vibe amongst consoles, an enigmatic spirit.

Team Andromeda
07-05-2018, 03:27 AM
Saturn is so freaking loaded with hidden gems and obscure titles PS1 didn't get.


There are a ton of hidden gems and obscure titles on the PS. The worst part of the Saturn is just down the market share we never really got to see what the system could do pushed to its limits and sadly never got to see planned titles like Shenmue or Sonic Adv ect. But the PS has plenty of gems and great games that people haven't the 1st clue over. I remember my mate at the Import shop raving over Ore No Ryouri and telling me I must buy it and I'm so glad I did. It a gem of a game that unlike anything around at the time or on the Saturn even.

Team Andromeda
07-05-2018, 03:35 AM
Best as I can find from a quick Googling, the PC-FX had two of the PC Engine's video chips, like the Supergrafx


The 2D hardware was the same as the Super Grafx and the PC FX could handle just 128 sprites, that wouldn't trouble the Neo Geo let alone the Saturn or PS. I'm amazing at how NEC and Hundon could go from making one of the most impressive consoles of all time and one that so far ahead of others in terms of tech, to making to lame duck consoles with undowpowered CPU's with the Super Grafx and PC FX.

Team Andromeda
07-05-2018, 03:38 AM
Part of what makes the Saturn cool in my eyes is the fact it was the underdog.... I play mine every day... I have four saturns..it’s my only sega system I use daily..
Completely agree . That's what made the Saturn all the more special. One would hear this talk of it couldn't do 3D and it was underpowered and time and time again, you'll have a game that would amazing and surprise you with amazing gfx and sound.
I have 6 Saturns and still have 2 main units set up.. One must have the Souky fix ...