People are easily persuaded by smooth talkers who offer all the answers with certainty.
At this point, I'm mostly convinced that Kalinske just didn't know what was going on with the software situation at SOA. He had delegated that to people like Joe Miller and he was hands-off.
Even in this interview, he was asked why SOA produced games like Bug! and Ghen War instead of the type of game that appealed to Genesis gamers. He answered by saying they had no choice in what games they produced. What kind of answer is that? It's well established that SOA produced its own selection of games. I really think he was just so far removed from the software side of the company by then that he didn't know the situation. I can't recall ever hearing him mention anything specific about software (aside from Sonic and Joe Montana) in interviews. He mostly deflects the questions in this interview or offers vague statements: "we needed more sports titles". But why wasn't your company making them?
This probably holds for the 32X and the Saturn as well. Kalinske was following Joe Miller's lead. In this interview, he was asked why he claimed in 1999 that the Saturn was "unmarketable". He pushed this aside with the answer that he didn't really know anything about hardware and was just saying what Joe Miller had said.
I think we're just not going to find the answers through Kalinske because his world at the time was focused on a tiny portion of the equation. He wasn't very involved in software or hardware decisions.
To offer my own take on the issue of short-term gains:
Focus on short-term gains was always SOA's weak point. They were a marketing company run by marketers. Success was measured only in sales and market share with no thought of the long-term.
The danger was giving the marketers power over design decisions.
For software, there was almost a single-minded focus on licensed properties. Licensed games were considered safe bets at the time - practically guaranteed to sell a certain number. Quality never seemed to come into the picture. They were unable to establish original brands effectively. This was the antithesis of the Nintendo approach.
For hardware, there was a quick rejection of the Saturn as unmarketable due to price, which gave birth to the 32X. These were marketing decisions born out of a short-sighted focus on sales.
SOA needed to be run as a game company with a strong marketing division, rather than as a marketing company that oversaw a game division. There should have been a focus on resolving the issues at STI that prevented so many games from being completed. There should have been a focus on building quality original brands. There should have been a focus on preparing for the Saturn from day 1.